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After a short update of the current more accepted definition of BLEVE, the special features of 
water BLEVEs are analyzed. The stronger overpressure wave generated in the case of water as 
compared to that of other substances is justified in terms of volume change. Through a 
comparison with liquefied pressurized propane, three possibilities are analyzed: the 
simultaneous contribution of both the liquid and the preexisting vapor, the contribution of the 
liquid flash vaporization, and the contribution of the pre-existing vapor. Also a historical survey 
on a set of 202 BLEVE accidents –the largest sample of BLEVE accidents surveyed until now– 
is presented. LPG was the most common substances in this set of accidents. However, water 
and LNG (11% of water and 4% of LNG in the studied cases) have also been involved. Impact 
failure (44.8%) and human factor (30.3%) were the most common causes of BLEVEs. 
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Among the different possible major accidents, Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions 
(BLEVEs) keep occurring from time to time. A number of equipment and activities can 
originate them: steam boilers, liquefied gas storage tanks, road and rail tankers, etc.  Even 
though their frequency seems to have decreased in the last decades, their effects keep being 
potentially very strong and the consequences on people can be very severe. 
Quite recently (August 8, 2018) a BLEVE followed by a fireball occurred in a highway near 
Bologna (Italy), after a tanker transporting LPG and a lorry collided. Two persons were killed 
and about 60 injured by the effects of the explosion and the fire. 
Two different physical effects are associated to a BLEVE: overpressure wave and ejected 
fragments; furthermore, serious thermal effects can occur if a flammable substance is involved, 
or, in some cases, toxic effects depending on the substance (for example, ammonia) (Abbasi 
and Abbasi, 2007). 
Both mechanical and thermal effects have been studied by a number of authors. Concerning 
the thermal effects, in many cases their consequences on people are more severe than those 
associated with blast wave and ejected fragments (Birk et al., 2013); as the thermal 
phenomenon (fireball) lasts a certain time, this has allowed the registration of an important 
number of photos and films, i.e., experimental data at large scale that have been used for its 
mathematical modeling. The blast wave has also been studied, both experimentally and by 
using data from accidental large-scale explosions (see, for example, Bubbico and Marchini, 
2008, and Birk et al., 2018). 
Due to the fact that, in the case of a flammable substance, the thermal effects are quite important 
and visible and often graphically recorded, the acronym BLEVE has often been used as a 
synonymous of the fireball. This is why many of these explosions occurred with non-
flammable substances have not been registered in the diverse accident data bases as BLEVEs, 
but with the general name of “explosion”. This is, for example, the case of steam boilers, even 
if most steam boiler explosions are really a BLEVE. 
In this communication, these concepts are revised, with special emphasis on the case of water, 
and a historical survey on a set of 202 BLEVE accidents (the largest set analyzed up to now) 
is performed to analyze the main causes and features of the occurrence of this accident. 
2. When is an explosion a BLEVE? 
After the BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosion) was described for the first time 
by Smith, Marsh, and Walls (Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007), a number of researchers have 
contributed to increase the knowledge on this accident. There has been some evolution 
concerning the exact definition of a BLEVE and which explosions should be considered as 
such. 
Reid (1979), through an accurate analysis of the phenomenon, considered the superheat limit 
temperature (Tsl) as a required condition for an explosion to be a BLEVE, defining this 
phenomenon as "the sudden loss of containment of a liquid that is at or above its superheating 
temperature limit". At this condition, due to the sudden depressurization, there is homogeneous 
nucleation in the whole mass of liquid and a sudden and important increase of volume. This 
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practically instantaneous flashing of liquid produces a strong blast wave. At this situation, the 
explosion should be classified as a BLEVE. And according to this theory, if the temperature of 
the liquid at the moment of the vessel failure is not equal or higher than its superheat limit 
temperature, the explosion will not be a BLEVE, and its severity will be lower.     
However, none of the different thermodynamic models proposed can justify an abrupt change 
in the overpressure at Tsl. Salla et al. (2006) arrived at the conclusion that Tsl corresponds to 
the situation in which the energy transferred between the cooling liquid and the vaporizing 
liquid fractions is at its maximum, leading the remaining liquid to a minimum content of 
energy. 
Some authors, as for example Birk et al.  (1993, 2007), performed BLEVE experiments and 
concluded that BLEVE explosions occurred at temperatures lower than Tsl. Thus, Reid’s theory 
is not applied nowadays, even though it can be useful for a better understanding of the BLEVE 
mechanism, and should be restricted to ideal, low scale laboratory conditions. In fact, this 
theory does not imply that the overall energy released in the explosion increases due to the fact 
that a different phenomenon occurs if the explosion takes place at a temperature equal or higher 
than the superheat limit one. What it would imply really is that, due to the fact that the boiling 
dynamics is much faster, practically instantaneous, the same energy would give rise to a higher 
overpressure and, therefore, to a much more severe explosion. Finally, another phenomenon 
that can have an important influence in many real cases and which would imply again a 
behavior different from that assumed in Reid’s theory is the probable temperature stratification 
in the liquid phase (Scarponi et al., 2018). When this occurs, there can be a strong temperature 
gradient in the liquid, the hottest layers being at the liquid surface, thus originating a much 
faster pressure built-up in the vapor zone (i.e., in the vessel). 
Another point which has also originated some controversy is related to the substance involved 
in the explosion. For example, some authors (Napier and Roopchand, 1986; Bernatik et al., 
2011; Pitblado et al., 2011) considered that a BLEVE could not occur with liquefied natural 
gas (LNG), even though BLEVEs have occurred really with this material. Finally, as 
commented before, there is also some confusion between the phenomena of BLEVE and 
fireball. 
The definition of this type of explosion commonly accepted nowadays is “a BLEVE is an 
explosion resulting from the failure of a vessel containing a liquid at a temperature significantly 
above its boiling point at atmospheric pressure” (CCPS, 1994). 
3. BLEVE overpressure 
One of the most common accidental scenarios leading to a BLEVE is the fire engulfment of a 
pressurized vessel. As the vessel heating proceeds the pressure inside it increases and, 
simultaneously, its wall weakens due to the increase of temperature; this effect is especially 
important in the upper section of the vessel, where the wall is not in contact with the liquid 
(Birk et al., 2006). And, after a certain time, the vessel fails and there is a violent phenomenon 
consisting in the expansion of the pre-existing vapor and the partial flash vaporization of the 
liquid; the practically instantaneous increase in volume originates the explosion with an 
overpressure wave and, often, ejection of vessel fragments. The overpressure wave can be very 
high in the near field (Laboureur et al., 2015).  
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There is now some discussion concerning the respective contributions to the overpressure wave 
of these two phenomena, the expansion of the pre-existing vapor and the expansion of the vapor 
originated by the explosive boiling of the liquid. Among the existing mathematical models for 
predicting the peak overpressure of the explosion, some authors (Prugh, 1991; Planas et al., 
2004) have taken both phenomena into consideration; others (Casal and Salla, 2006) have 
considered only the contribution of the liquid boiling; and finally, some others (Birk et al., 
2007, 2018) consider that the expansion of the pre-existing vapor is the sole contribution to the 
maximum peak overpressure due to the faster phenomenon of vapor expansion as compared to 
the vaporization-and-expansion of the liquid. Of course, the respective contributions to 
overpressure wave of liquid vaporization and pre-existing vapor will depend on the masses of 
each phase present in the vessel.  
In order to give an approximate idea of the differences that these assumptions can imply in the 
estimation of the peak overpressure, this overpressure has been calculated in the next section 
by assuming a) only the contribution of liquid flash vaporization (Casal and Salla, 2006),  b) 
the contribution of the liquid vaporization plus that due to the pre-existing vapor (Prugh, 1991; 
Planas et al., 2004), and c) contribution of preexisting vapor (Birk et al., 2007, 2018; Johnson 
et al., 1990). The calculation has been performed for the same amount of two substances, water 
and propane 
4. The case of water 
A quite interesting case is that of vessels containing water at a relatively high temperature and 
pressure, which certainly can undergo a BLEVE if the vessel collapses and fails for any reason. 
Steam boilers are a good example. Although safety measures (liquid level controls, pressure 
relief valves, etc.) are provided, it is a fact that steam boiler explosions occur from time to time, 
due to the very high number of this equipment existing in many industries around the world. 
Two types of explosions can occur in a boiler: a) a fuel-air explosion in the furnace, and b) a 
BLEVE. This second case is much more frequent than the first one, but in most cases these 
explosions are not registered as BLEVEs, due essentially to the fact that water is not flammable 
and, therefore, no fireball follows the explosion. This is undoubtedly the reason why the 
number of water BLEVEs in most surveys and in the historical analysis included in the next 
section is rather low. 
However, the effects of these explosions are very severe, the overpressure being usually 
significantly stronger than that generated in the explosion of vessels containing the same mass 
of other materials. This different behavior can be explained in terms of the physical change 
underwent by the liquid and vapor in the explosion, which will depend on the involved material. 
Here it has been analyzed for water and propane. Three options have been assumed, as 
previously mentioned: a) simultaneous contribution of both the liquid and the preexisting 
vapor, b) contribution of the liquid flash vaporization and c) contribution of the pre-existing 
vapor. 
 
a) Simultaneous contribution of the liquid and the preexisting vapor 
Fig. 1 shows the comparison of the energy released (kJ/m3 of vessel) by the explosion of a 
vessel containing water and another one containing propane. The calculation has been 
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performed taking into account the contribution of both the expansion of the pre-existing vapor 
and that of the vapor produced by the flash partial vaporization of the liquid, by applying the 
method described by Hemmatian et al. (2017). The vessel conditions assumed for both cases 
have been a pressure of 8.4 bar abs. and saturated conditions (i.e., a temperature of 172.5 ℃ 
for water and 20 ℃ for propane), and the released energy has been calculated for different 
filling levels (FL). 
As it can be seen, the energy released is much higher for the case of water than for propane, 
assuming the same bursting pressure. For example, for a filling level of 50% (FL = 0.5), the 
energy released in the case of water would be approximately 11.2 MJ m-3 and for propane 
would be 3.9 MJ m-3. This behavior can be explained as a function of the amount of vapor 
generated in the flash vaporization of the liquid in each case and on the different rate of volume 
increase with the changing conditions (before and after the explosion) for the two substances.  
 
Fig. 1. Comparison of the energy released in the BLEVE of water and propane vessels at 8.4 
bar and saturated temperature of 172.5 ºC for water and 20 ºC for propane. 
 
b) Contribution of the liquid flash vaporization 
Concerning the flash vaporization of the liquid in the vessel at the moment of the explosion, in 
the case of water, for each kg of liquid 0.134 kg of vapor are generated; this vapor (at 100 ℃) 
has a volume of 0.227 m3, this implying an increase in volume of 0.227 – 0.000134 = 0.2269 
m3 per kg of liquid in the vessel. Instead, in the case of propane each kg of liquid (with a volume 
of 0.711 liters) generates 0.352 kg of vapor, with a volume (at -42 ºC) of 0.152 m3; the increase 
in volume is only 0.152 – 0.00071 = 0.1513 m3 per kilogram of liquid. Therefore, the ratio of 
volume changes water/ propane is: 
Ratio of volume change water/propane in the flash vaporization = 0.2269/0.1513 = 1.5 
If only the contribution of liquid flash vaporization is taken into account (Casal and Salla, 



















water:  SE = 721-418.9 = 302 kJ kg-1 
             overpressure energy (irreversible process): 0.05 · 302 = 15.1 kJ kg-1  
propane:  SE = 250-100.2 = 149.8 kJ kg-1 
  overpressure energy (irreversible process): 0.05 · 149.8 = 7.49 kJ kg-1 
            Ratio of superheating energy water/propane = 15.1/7.49 = 2 
Even though these two ratios will change according to the vessel condition at the moment of 
the explosion, they are the explanation of why the steam boiler BLEVEs are so severe as 
compared to the explosions involving other materials. 
c) Contribution of the pre-existing vapor 
If, as some authors have proposed, only the first peak of the BLEVE (associated to the 
expansion of the pre-existing vapor just before the explosion) is the responsible of the peak 
overpressure (Birk et al., 2007, 2018; Johnson et al., 1990), then the increase in volume for 
water and propane, respectively, would be: 
water: volume of 1 kg of vapor at 8.4 bar abs and 172.5 ºC: 0.225 m3 
 volume at 1 atm and 100 ºC = 1.694 m3 
 volume increase: 1.694-0.225 = 1.469 m3 kg-1 
propane: volume of 1 kg of vapor at 8.4 bar abs. and 20 ºC: 0.055 m3 
 volume at 1 atm and -42 ºC: 0.4319 m3 
 volume increase: 0.432- 0.055 = 0.377 m3 kg-1 
Ratio of vapor volume change water/propane = 1.469/0.377 = 3.9 
Again, the different increase in volume due to the explosion justifies the higher peak 
overpressures usually reached with water BLEVEs. 
5. Occurrence of BLEVEs: a historical survey 
The historical analysis of BLEVE accidents is an interesting way to understand them better, as 
it can give a good overview of this phenomenon and which important factors play a role in it. 
A first historical analysis restricted to fire domino effect had been done with 127 cases 
(Hemmatian et al., 2015); this set has now been enlarged to 202, including other initiating 
events. MHIDAS (Major Hazard Incident Data Service) database (2007) was used to obtain 
some data. Other databases were also consulted: Analysis, Research and Information on 
Accidents (ARIA) (2012), Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) (2012), and Failure and 
ACcidents Technical information System (FACTS) (2010). The lack of information in some 
accidents was fulfilled by getting the assistance of other available resources such as the U.S. 
Chemical Safety Board (2012), the U. S. National Transport Safety Board (2013) and the 
National Fire Protection Association (2012).  Microsoft Access® was used in order to manage 
and classify the data and to avoid recording more than once a given accident. 
Only accidents occurred after 1st January 1960 have been taken into account, in order to obtain 
results useful and representative of the nowadays industry and transport main features 
(Hemmatian et al., 2014). This survey considers accidents occurred in process plants, in storage 
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areas and in the transportation of hazardous materials (road, rail, and ship); it also includes 
accidents that have occurred because of natural events such as earthquakes or floods.  
5.1 Distribution of accidents according to the time and location 
The frequencies of the BLEVE accidents as a function of time have been plotted in Fig 2. The 
highest frequency belongs to the 70’s (24.8%). The occurrence of this type of accidents seems 
to decrease afterward, although a clear trend cannot be really observed. A fact that could have 
some influence is the much better access to information on major accidents (BLEVE included) 
in the last decades; this could contribute to increase the frequency of registered cases.  
 
Fig. 2. Distribution of BLEVEs over the time. 
The selected accidents have also been classified by their region. This type of classification was 
done by considering different factors such as political and development-based criteria. 
Countries in the world were classified into three groups: 
- European Union (19.8%), 
- other developed countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, New Zealand, Switzerland, Norway and 
the United States (51%), 
- rest of the world (29.2%). 
 
In fact, we assume that this criterion can imply some bias in the statistical analysis, as both the 
geopolitical and economic circumstances of some countries have considerably evolved since 
the 1960s; however, as other previous analyses have also used it (Darbra et al., 2010; 
Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2011), it seems reasonably to keep it.  
According to this classification, the highest percentage (70.8%) is found in the developed 
countries. This should be attributed to the presence of an important number of plants and to the 
associated transportation and storage infrastructures in these countries. Moreover, in developed 
countries, due to the existing policies and institutions in the fields of safety and environment, 



































Fig. 3 shows the frequencies of BLEVEs as a function of time in the three different groups of 
countries; even though there is an important dispersion of data, the general trend of the 
frequency is clear: the contribution of developing countries has increased in recent years, while 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































BLEVEs in rest of the world
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5.2 Substances involved 
According to the previous definition (Section 2), it can be expected that substances with boiling 
temperature lower than ambient temperature –such as light hydrocarbons– are prone to 
BLEVE. Table 1 shows the substances involved in the 202 BLEVE accidents here analyzed. 
282 substances have been identified, as in some of the accidents more than one substance were 
simultaneously involved (this is why percentages add up to more than 100). As it can be seen 
in this table, LPG was by large the most frequent material, being found in 59% of BLEVEs, 
followed by water (11%); LNG took part in 4% of the BLEVE accidents. The high number of 
accidents involving LPG is due to the (relative) frequency with which road and rail tankers 
transporting this material have accidents (derailment, collision) that lead to a BLEVE-fireball. 
As for the 30% of the category “other chemical substances”, it includes but is not limited to: 
naphtha, isopropyl alcohol, methanol, and ethyl alcohol. 
Table 1. Substances involved in BLEVEs 
Substance Number of accidents Percentage 
LPG 120 59 
Water 22 11 
Oil 12 6 
Vinyl chloride 11 5 
Gasoline/Petrol/Diesel/Kerosene 9 5 
LNG 8 4 
Ethylene oxide 7 4 
Carbon dioxide 6 3 
Propylene 5 3 
Ethylene 4 2 
Ammonia 3 2 
Chlorine 3 2 
Butadiene 3 2 
Toluene diisocyanate 3 2 
Sodium hydroxide 3 2 
Sulfuric acid 3 2 
Other chemical substances 60 30 
Total 282 144 
 
Concerning water, the following consideration must be done: probably the number of BLEVEs 
involving it has been much larger than those registered in databases, as the number of steam 
boilers and hot water tanks is very high in most countries; however, as water is not flammable 
and therefore it does not originate any subsequent fireball, probably many of such cases had 
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not been registered as BLEVEs. Nevertheless, not all steam boiler explosions could be 
systematically included in the survey, as probably some of them were not a BLEVE; therefore, 
only those cases registered as such have been included in this survey. 
5.3 General/specific causes 
Understanding the main causes of accidents can be a good mean to prevent further similar 
accidents. In Table 2, MHIDAS database categories for generic causes were used to identify 
the causes of BLEVE accidents. The total number of causes were larger than the number of 
BLEVE accidents because in some accidents there were more than one cause. General causes 
of accidents were not specified in 37 (18.3%) out of 202 cases; the results in Table 2 correspond 
thus to 165 accidents. Impact failure (44.8%) followed by human factor (30.3%) and 
mechanical failure (29.1%) were the main causes. 













Impact failure 74 44.8 17.6 67.4 19 
Human factor 50 30.3 41.2 19.1 42.9 
Mechanical failure 48 29.1 41.2 24.7 26.2 
External events 42 25.5 17.6 30.3 21.4 
Instrument failure 8 4.8 8.8 4.5 2.4 
Violent (runaway) 
reaction 
5 3 - 4.5 2.4 
Service failure 2 1.2 - 1.1 2.4 
Upset process 
conditions 
1 0.6 2.9 - - 
Total 230 139.3 129.3 151.6 116.7 
 
A detailed analysis was also performed by referring to each region. In European countries, 
mechanical failure (41.2%) and human factor (41.2%) were the most probable causes of 
BLEVEs, while in other developed countries it was impact failure (67.4%). However, human 
factor (42.9%) and mechanical failure (26.2%) were the main causes of the accidents in the rest 
of the world. The high incidence of human factor (30.3% of all accidents) would indicate the 
convenience of a higher effort in training operators and improving the safety culture. 
Each general cause was subdivided into specific causes in Table 3. Rail accidents (53%) and 
road accidents (26%) were the most frequent specific ones in impact failure. Regarding human 
factor, bad maintenance (33%) followed by general operation (14%) were the main frequent 
ones. Finally, overheating (33%) and overpressure (20%) were was the main specific cause in 




Table 3. Specific causes of BLEVEs 




Impact failure (44.8%) Rail accident 43 53 
 Road accident 21 26 
 Other vehicle 11 14 
 Heavy object 4 5 
 Excavating equipment 1 1 
 Ship to ship collision also barges 1 1 
Human factor (30.3%) Bad maintenance 12 33 
 General operation 5 14 
 Overfilling 4 11 
 Management 4 11 
 Procedures 4 11 
 Failure to connect or disconnect 2 6 
 Design error 2 6 
 Draining accident 2 6 
 
Failure to isolate or drain before 
uncoupling 
1 2 
Mechanical failure (29.1%) Overheating 21 33 
 Overpressure 13 20 
 Corrosion 5 8 
 Brittle failure 4 6 
 Leaking coupling or flange 4 6 
 Hose 4 6 
 Relief valve failure 3 5 
 Weld failure 3 5 
 Leaking or passing valve 3 5 
 Metallurgical failure 2 3 
 Fatigue  2 3 
External events (25.5%) Fire 33 70 
 Explosion 8 17 
 Temperature extremes 4 9 
 Earthquake 2 4 
Instrument failure (4.8%) Indicator 2 33 
 Trip 2 33 
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 Controller 2 33 
Violent reaction (3%) Runaway reaction 4 100 
Service failure (1.2%) Electricity 2 100 
Upset process conditions 
(0.6%)1 
- - - 
1For this case MHIDAS does not have any categories 
5.4 General/specific origin 
The general origin of accidents (Table 4) gives interesting information concerning the activities 
in which the probability of such accidents is higher; the total percentages of accidents are higher 
than 100 again, because some accidents had different origins. Overall, transport (43.1%) and 
storage area (20.8%) obviously had dominant percentages than the other groups. Process plants 
have a significant contribution as well. The contribution of transport, quite high, is essentially 
similar to the one already found in a previous survey, 39% (Abbasi and Abbasi, 2007), and in 
the analysis of all major accidents (39.1%, Vílchez et al., 1995). Transfer, essentially 
loading/unloading operations, was involved in 12.4% of cases, in most of them through domino 
effect (see, for example, Demichela et al., 2004).  
 













Transport 87 43.1 30 54.4 32.2 
Storage area 42 20.8 15 23.3 20.3 
Process plant 33 16.3 20 8.7 27.1 
Transfer 25 12.4 20 9.7 11.9 
Domestic/commercial 
premises 
16 7.9 12.5 3.9 11.9 
Warehouse 3 1.5 2.5 1 1.7 
Disposal area 2 1 2.5 1 - 
Total 208 103 102.5 102 105.1 
 
The general origin of accidents was also investigated for the different parts of the world; 
transport was the main origin: EU (30%), other developed countries (54.4%), and rest of the 
world (32.2%). It was followed by process plants. 
The specific origin of the accidents was also studied. According to the data gathered in Table 5, 




Table 5. Specific origin of BLEVEs  
Specific origin No. of accidents Percentage 
Rail tanker 53 26.2 
Road tanker 39 19.3 
Pressurized storage vessel 35 17.3 
Portable transport container 18 8.9 
Steam boiler 16 7.9 
Fired process equipment 8 4 
On-plant pipes and associated 
valves 
6 3 
Atmospheric pressure storage 
tank 
6 3 
Heat exchanger 5 2.5 
Ship 5 2.5 
Tank container 4 2 
Pipeline 4 2 
Process vessels 3 1.5 
Reactor 3 1.5 
Other 5 2.5 
Total 210 104.1 
 
5.5 Affected population 
The affected population is one of the important aspects in safety and risk analysis, and reducing 
the number of people affected by the BLEVE consequences is the aim of many scientific 
studies in the field of safety and loss prevention. The affected population can be classified in 
three groups: fatalities, injuries, and evacuees. The results presented here are just for those 
cases where information was available (in 76% of cases for fatalities, for injuries in 78% and 
for evacuees in 40.1%). 
In 154 BLEVEs occurred since 1960, about 1568 people were killed; a detailed study was 
performed on them. The 𝑝 − 𝑁 curve is usually used to represent the lethality of accidents (Fig. 
4). In this plot, the number of fatalities (𝑁) is shown on the abscissae and the probability of a 
BLEVE accident with fatalities equal or greater than 𝑁 (for 𝑁 = 1, 𝑝 = 1) is illustrated on its 
ordinate axis. In fact, the accumulated probability of BLEVE accidents can be represented by 
this illustrative curve as a function of its severity. The accumulated probability was calculated 
by the least square method. The resulting function was 𝑝 = 𝑁𝑏, with the b value equal to -0.74. 
This means that the accumulated probability of BLEVE accidents that causes 10 or more deaths 
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Fig. 4. Accumulated probability as a function of number of deaths for the 104 BLEVEs 
involving fatalities. 
The accumulated probability of fatalities versus the number of deaths was also calculated for 
different parts of the world (Fig. 5). The accumulated probability of number of deaths is clearly 
higher for the “rest of the world” (in which case there is a light deviation from the general rule, 
as often happens,  at P values near 1) as compared to that of the EU and the developed countries. 
It is clear from this plot that the consequences of a severe accident, in terms of lethality, are 
more important in the developing countries; for example, the probability of having an accident 





















Fig. 5. Accumulated probability as a function of number of deaths according to the development 
degree of the countries. 
The analysis of the number of injuries in the accidents (Table 6) showed that only 24.2% of 
accidents had no injured and 40.8% of accidents had between 1 and 10 injured; in 29.9% of 
cases there were between 11 and 100 injured; and only 5.1% had more than 100 injured people. 
Table 6. BLEVEs injured 
Injured No. of accidents Percentage 
No injuries 38 24.2 
1-10 64 40.8 
11-100 47 29.9 
101-1000 7 4.5 
>1000 1 0.6 
Total 157 100 
 
Further analysis (Table 7) showed that in 48.1% of BLEVE accidents there were no evacuees, 
in 18.5% there were between 1 – 100, in 13.6% there were between 101 – 1000, in 13.6% there 
were between 1001 – 10,000, and in only 6.2% of accidents there were more than 10,000 people 
evacuated.  

















Number of deaths (N)
EU Other developed countries Rest of the world
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Table 7. BLEVEs evacuees 
Evacuees No. of accidents Percentage 
No evacuees 39 48.1 
1-10 11 13.6 
11-100 4 4.9 
101-1000 11 13.6 
1001-10,000 11 13.6 
>10,000 5 6.2 
Total 74 100 
As a final comment to the consequences on people, the following should be taken into account: 
in the event of a BLEVE followed –as often happens– by a fireball, most of the consequences 
–fatalities, injured people– are associated to the thermal radiation from the fireball. As an 
example, the following case can be mentioned (Birk et al., 2013): the explosion-fireball of a 
spherical tank with a volume of 2000 m3 containing propane, at different filling degrees. These 
authors calculated the distance at which a peak overpressure of 0.3 bar (often accepted in 
quantitative risk analysis as the overpressure implying a 100% lethality for both direct and 
indirect effects) would be reached, as well as the corresponding fireball diameter and duration; 
the values for two filling degrees can be seen in Table 8. 
Table 8. 100% lethality distances 





Time* (s) Distance – 100% 
lethality** (m) 
0.2 82 377 28 360 
0.8 107 531 40 650 
*Birk et al., 2013 **This work 
 For a filling degree of 20% the distance at which ∆P = 0.3 bar was 82 m and the fireball 
diameter was 377 m; and for a filling degree of 80%, the distance was 107 m and the diameter 
531 m. If, for these two fireballs we calculate the distance at which the lethality due to the 
thermal radiation would be 100% we obtain 360 m and 650 m, respectively. It is clear, 
therefore, that in most cases (except for the linear ejection of fragments) the consequences on 
people due to the fireball will be much more severe than those due to overpressure wave. 
6. Conclusions 
Two aspects concerning BLEVEs have been analyzed: first, the main features of those 
explosions involving water –which have received relatively low attention in the literature– and, 
secondly, the main features of the BLEVE occurrence as a function of the materials involved, 
causes, origin and consequences on people. 
The case of water is especially interesting: although many steam boiler explosions are probably 
BLEVEs (but not all: some of them are associated to combustion chamber explosions), they 
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are not registered as such due to the fact that they are not followed by a fireball; this is why 
they are underrepresented in this type of surveys. Nevertheless, the energy released from a 
water BLEVE will be significantly stronger than that originated by the same amount of other 
substances such as, for example, LPG; and, therefore, the corresponding overpressure wave 
and the peak overpressure will also be higher. This is essentially due to the higher volume 
change associated both to the vapor expansion and to the liquid vaporization for the case of 
water; a comparison with propane values clearly demonstrates this. 
The historical analysis of 202 cases has shown that the most common substance associated 
with BLEVE is LPG. As for the general origin of these events, transport is the most common 
activity, followed by storage and process plants; transfer (loading/unloading) keeps having an 
overall value of approximately 12%, as already found in other surveys on major accidents.  
According to this information, a further effort should be made to reduce the risk in the 
transportation of LPG and LNG by road and rail; in this regard, the increasing use in certain 
countries of double wall tanks would be quite positive. The prediction of the BLEVE frequency 
(necessary for a quantitative risk analysis) could probably be estimated for both road and rail 
transport by performing an accurate analysis of all accidents occurred in these transportation 
modes in diverse countries (traffic accident and derailment frequency, frequency of BLEVE in 
the event of such accidents). This could be studied in future research, as well as its relationship 
with the existing regulations and procedures and their possible improvement. 
Some attention should also be devoted to loading/unloading operations: even if it is well known 
that they are dangerous and the responsible of approximately 10% of all major accidents, 
BLEVEs keep occurring during them. So, an effort should be applied to analyze and improve 
the procedures and safeguards in these operations. 
Finally, the analysis of the frequency of BLEVEs in the different world regions could be 
associated with the positive influence of the regulations existing in the developed countries. 
Concerning the developing ones, besides a possible improvement of these regulations in certain 
cases, the influence of the increase in their population and of the “Industrialization Intensity 
Index” have probably an important influence on the higher incidence of the accidents. 
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